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This paper investigates whether attacks against Israeli targets help Palestinian factions gain public
support. We link individual level survey data to the full list of Israeli fatalities during the period of
the Second Intifada (2000-2006), and estimate a flexible discrete choice model for faction supported.
We find some support for the “outbidding” hypothesis, the notion that Palestinian factions use violence
to gain prestige and influence public opinion within the community. In particular, the two leading
Palestinian factions, Hamas and Fatah, gain in popularity following successful attacks against Israeli
targets. Our results suggest, however, that most movement occurs within either the secular groups
or the Islamist groups, and not between them. That is, Fatah’s gains come at the expense of smaller
secular factions while Hamas’ gains come at the expense of smaller Islamic factions and the disaffected.
In contrast, attacks by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad lower support for that faction.
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1. Introduction 
 The  Second  Palestinian  Intifada  has  been  characterized  not  only  by  the  intensity  of 
violence  between  the  Palestinians  and  Israel,  but  also  by  the  struggle  between  the  different 
Palestinian  factions  for  supremacy  within  the  Palestinian  community.    The  Intifada  has  had 
profound consequences for the whole Palestinian political landscape.  For example, Hamas, an 
Islamist movement responsible for more than 40 percent of Israeli fatalities between 2000 and 
2005, secured a large victory in the 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council.
1  Can 
Hamas’s electoral success be linked causally to its violent campaign against Israeli targets?  In 
this paper we seek to answer this question specifically, and, more broadly, we investigate the 
extent  to  which  Palestinian  factions  can  use  violence  to  win  public  support  from  their 
constituents. 
Mia Bloom (Bloom 2004, 2005) has hypothesized that Palestinian factions are engaged in 
competition  for  leadership  within  the  community  and  use  attacks  against  Israeli  targets  to 
increase their prestige and influence the preferences of the Palestinian population.  There are a 
number of potential theoretical explanations for why attacks against Israelis could boost public 
support for the faction responsible.  A first possibility is that violence against Israel can be 
viewed as a public good.  The Palestinian public has a taste for retaliation against Israel’s actions 
(de Figuereido and Weingast 2001), and therefore factions that are able to successfully attack 
                                                 
1 Hamas eventually took control of the whole Gaza Strip after forcing out Fatah forces loyal to 
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in June 2007.  As a result of the 2007 violence, the 
territory controlled by the Palestinian Authority is today de facto divided into two entities, the 
Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip and a Fatah-controlled West Bank.   2 
Israeli targets gain in popularity.  This model predicts that successful attacks by a given faction 
will raise support for that faction at the expense of all other factions.  
A second closely related explanation is that successful attacks are used as a device that 
signals the faction’s ability to deliver public goods.  Successful attacks reveal that the faction is 
of  “high  quality”  and  will  also  be  effective  in  the  provision  of  other  public  goods  such  as 
schools, hospitals, and other social services.  This argument is directly made by Lapan and 
Sandler (1993) and by Kydd and Walter (2006), and also implied in the analysis put forward by 
Berman and Laitin (2008) to explain the effectiveness of religious radicals in conducting violent 
insurgent campaigns.  According to Berman and Laitin (2008), radical groups are able to conduct 
effective campaigns because the prohibitions they impose on their members allow them to select 
only those most committed to the cause and those less likely to defect.  Hence, successful attacks 
against Israeli targets signal that the faction responsible has highly committed members, and that 
those members will not be tempted by corruption and will deliver good governance in other 
dimensions of public activity as well.   
As in the “violence as public good” model, the “violence as signal” model predicts that 
successful attacks by a given faction will raise support for that faction at the expense of all other 
factions.  Both of these explanations predict that violence by a given faction will raise support 
for that faction.  This need not necessarily be the case, however.  An alternative theory posits that 
Palestinians  commit  acts  of  violence  to  provoke  an  indiscriminate  violent  Israeli  response.  
Israeli  indiscriminate  violence  in  turn,  causes  the  overall  radicalization  of  the  Palestinian 
population, mostly because they dampen economic opportunities in the market economy (Bueno 
de Mesquita and Dickson, 2007; Blomberg et al., 2004).  Therefore, only radical factions, such 
as  Hamas  and  the  Palestinian  Islamic  Jihad  (PIJ),  benefit  from  violence,  whereas  relatively   3 
moderate factions such as Fatah will lose public support in response to violence by any of the 
factions.
2  
To answer these questions, we have assembled a unique data set that links micro-level 
survey data on Palestinian public opinion to the complete list of Israeli and Palestinian fatalities 
from the outset of the second Intifada up to the end of 2005.  Moreover, we have identified for 
each Israeli fatality the district of origin of the attacker and his or her organizational affiliation.  
To study the effect of violence on Palestinian public opinion, we estimate a completely flexible 
discrete choice model where we allow the choice of faction supported to depend on the number 
of Israeli fatalities claimed by each faction in the three months preceding the survey.  We control 
for potential endogeneity between local public support and violent activity by including a full set 
of district dummies in each of our regressions.  Hence, the effect of interest is identified from 
variation within districts and over time in violence and public opinion.  The model is flexible in 
the sense that the effect of the number of Israeli fatalities claimed by Hamas, say, on support for 
Hamas is not restricted to be the same as the effect of the number of Israeli fatalities claimed by 
Fatah on support for Fatah.  Similarly, no restrictions are imposed on any of the cross-effects 
(i.e., the effect of violence by one faction on support for other factions). 
We find some support for the outbidding hypothesis, with one notable exception.  For the 
two main factions, Fatah and Hamas, successful attacks against Israeli targets are associated with 
an increase in public support, even though the effect is rather small, and statistically significant 
only for the latter.  Contrary to the predictions of the outbidding model, support for both of these 
                                                 
2 Garfinkel (2004) also studies the effects of terrorism on domestic politics, but focuses on the 
struggle for power within the entity that is subject to an external terrorist threat.    4 
factions remains essentially unchanged when the other faction engages in violence.  Fatah’s and 
Hamas’ gains in support from successful attacks against Israelis do not come at the expense of 
each other’s support.  Rather, Hamas gains public support mostly at the expense of other Islamist 
groups like Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the disaffected (those who support no one), while Fatah 
gains  mostly  at  the  expense  of  supporters  of  other  secular  groups  like  the  Popular  and 
Democratic Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP and DFLP, respectively).  Notably, 
Israeli fatalities caused by PIJ are associated with a large and statistically significant decrease in 
support for it, as well as a decrease in support for Hamas, while the ranks of the disaffected 
increase.  These results suggest that to the extent that violence causes shifts in support, these 
shifts occur largely within either the secular (Fatah, PFLP and DFLP) or Islamist (Hamas, PIJ) 
factions and not between the secular and Islamist groups. 
 
2. Data 
For the purposes of the current study we combine two separate data sets: one describes 
the  political  preferences  of  the  Palestinian  population  while  the  other  contains  detailed 
information on all the Israeli and Palestinian fatalities during the second Palestinian uprising. 
The  information  on  Palestinians’  political  preferences  comes  from  a  set  of  surveys 
conducted by the Development Studies Programme (DSP) at Bir Zeit University.  This institute 
has conducted regular public opinion polls on all aspects of Palestinian life since the year 2000.  
Every poll has around 1,200 observations, with approximately two thirds of them from the West 
Bank  and  Jerusalem  and  the  rest  from  the  Gaza  Strip.    General  information  on  these  polls, 
including summary results and demographic information are available from Jaeger et al. (2010).    5 
In this paper, we focus exclusively on the preferences of the Palestinian population across 
the  different  Palestinian  political  factions.    The  exact  wording  of  the  question  of  interest  is 
“Which of the following political groups do you support?”  The available answers include Fatah 
and Hamas, the two major Palestinian factions during the time period of interest.  They also 
included other popular factions like the Palestinian Islamic Jihad as well as the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
(DFLP),  the  two  main  leftist  factions.    In  addition,  respondents  who  stated  that  they  were 
independent were asked whether their preferences leaned towards Fatah, to one of the Islamic 
factions, or to one of the leftist factions.  We coded independents leaning towards one of the 
factions together with that faction’s outright supporters.  We also coded all the Islamic factions 
(except  Hamas)  together  with  PIJ.    The  question  on  political  support  appeared  in  15  polls 
between February 2001 and May 2006, for a total of 17,406 observations.
3  
Figure  1  depicts  the  evolution  of  Palestinians  political  preferences  over  time.    We 
summarize these movements on an annual basis in Table 1.  Over the whole period of interest, 
support  for  Fatah  is  on  average  29.1  percent  while  Hamas  receives  23.0  percent  of  the 
population’s support.  The support for PIJ equals almost ten percent, very similar to the support 
enjoyed by other groups (comprised mostly by the leftist groups PFLP and DFLP).  Notably, the 
proportion of respondents reporting that they do not support any group was 28.5 percent, nearly 
as large as the proportion supporting Fatah.  This suggests that a large fraction of the Palestinian 
                                                 
3 In particular, this question appeared in three surveys in each of the years 2001, 2003, 2004 and 
2006, in two surveys in 2002, and in one survey in 2005.   6 
population feels disaffection from the Palestinian political factions. We address this issue in our 
empirical analysis and characterize the attitudes of this group. 
  Focusing on the factions’ average support over the entire time period of interest masks, 
however, interesting secular shifts in the political preferences of the Palestinian population that 
occurred over time. The support for Fatah began at around 23 percent in 2001 and peaked in 
September 2005 at 43.72 percent.  After the death of Yasser Arafat, support for Fatah increased 
by more than 10 percentage points.  Support for Hamas has also been variable, reaching its 
lowest point of about 15 percent in early 2003 and peaking at nearly 40 percent in March 2006.  
Support for PIJ and the other Islamic faction has been relatively steady except for in 2003 when 
it  increased  substantially,  largely  at  the  expense  of  support  for  Hamas.    The  degree  of 
disaffection (support for no one) and other groups was relatively high in the first years of the 
Intifada, but has declined since 2003, seemingly mostly to the benefit of Fatah.  
Information on Israeli and Palestinian fatalities during the second Intifada is taken from 
B’tselem, an Israeli human rights organization.  B’tselem’s data (thought to be accurate, reliable, 
and  comprehensive)  are  widely  used  in  studies  focusing  on  the  Israeli-Palestinian  conflict 
(Becker and Rubinstein 2008, Jaeger and Paserman 2006, 2008, 2009, Gould and Klor 2010, and 
others).  The data include information on the date, location, and circumstances of each fatality 
(excluding suicide bombers), which allows us to classify every Palestinian fatality according to   7 
the Palestinian district where the incident took place, and every Israeli fatality according to the 
district where the attack originated.
4 
We then cross-validated the B’tselem data with data downloaded between 2005 and 2006 
from the web site of the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) in Hertzliya, Israel 
(http://www.ict.org.il),
5  from  the  Israeli  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  and  from  published 
newspaper reports from the Jerusalem Post and other media outlets.  These data were used to 
identify the group claiming responsibility for every Israeli fatality.  Thanks to the use of multiple 
sources, we were able to identify the faction responsible for the attack for 99 percent of all Israeli 
fatalities.
6 
This paper’s primary concern is not how Palestinian public opinion varies with the number 
of fatalities (an issue we have previously explored in Jaeger, et al. 2010), but rather whether 
public opinion varies with violence claimed by different factions.  In Figure 2 we show the share 
                                                 
4 In the isolated instances in which it was not possible to identify the district of origin of the 
attacker, we assumed that the district of origin was the Palestinian district nearest to the place of 
the attack. 
5  The  database  with  information  on  all  fatalities  during  the  Intifada  is  no  longer  publicly 
available on the ICT web site.  
6 Israeli fatalities unaccounted for are classified as claimed by “other” groups.  There is a small 
number of cases in which more than one group claimed responsibility for an attack, or an attack 
was carried out jointly by more than one group.  In these cases, we tried to use the best of our 
own  judgment  to  assign  a  unique  faction  to  each  fatality.    Excluding  these  cases  from  the 
analysis has no substantive effect on the results.   8 
of  Israeli  fatalities  claimed  by  the  different  factions  aggregated  quarterly  (there  are  too  few 
fatalities  for  this  graph  to  be  meaningful  at  the  weekly  level).    There  is  a  fair  amount  of 
variability in which faction claims responsibility.  Prior to the 2005 Hudna, or period with a 
cease-fire, most fatalities are claimed by either Fatah or Hamas, with Palestinian Islamic Jihad 
and other Islamic factions occasionally becoming the primary actors.  After 2005, nearly all 
fatalities are claimed by PIJ and other groups.  Thus, there is a large degree of variation to 
identify our model of outbidding. 
 
3. Empirical Framework 
  We set up a discrete choice model to study the effects of Palestinian and Israeli violence 
on support for the different Palestinian factions.  We start from a random utility model where we 
specify  the  individual’s  utility  from  each  one  of  the  five  different  possible  choices:  Fatah, 
Hamas, PIJ, Others and No One, labeled from 0 to 4.  Let Ujidt be the utility from faction j for 
individual i living in district d at time t : 
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∑ + XidtΦ j +δtj + µdj +ε jidt, for j = 0,1,...,4.                  (1) 
where Pdt is a vector of lags of Palestinian fatalities that occurred in district d at time t;   is a 
vector of lags of Israeli fatalities caused by faction k, originating from district d at time t (notice 
that  , since there are no fatalities claimed by “No One”, faction number 4);   is a 
vector of individual, district, or time-specific characteristics;  δtj is a faction-specific, time fixed 
effect;  µdj is a faction-specific, district fixed effect; εjitd is an error term with a type-1 extreme 
value distribution; and   are parameters to be estimated (we already impose   9 
here the normalization that   are all equal to zero, which is necessary for 
identification).    As  is  well  known,  this  model  gives  rise  to  the  multinomial  logit  choice 
probabilities.  That is, the probability that individual i chooses faction j is equal to: 
                          (2) 
  We will also estimate a simplified version of equation (2), where we look at the effect of 
overall Israeli fatalities on support for the different factions.  This equation will tell us more 
generally how violence against Israeli targets affects public opinion.  The choice probabilities 
then become: 
                         (2’) 
 
  It is worth remarking on a number of features of equation (2). 
1)  Flexible specification.  The model assumes that the utility derived from a given faction 
depends not only on the number of (lagged) Israeli fatalities claimed by that faction, but also on 
the number of Israeli fatalities claimed by all other factions.  This allows a completely flexible 
pattern of own and cross effects.  That is, it is possible that fatalities claimed by one faction (say, 
Hamas) raise public support for that faction, while fatalities claimed by a different faction (say, 
PIJ) lower support for it.  Also, fatalities claimed by one faction may raise public support for that 
faction, but this does not need to be at the expense of all the other factions: some factions may 
enjoy positive spillover effects from the violence claimed by some of its rivals.  Finally, the   10 
flexible specification allows us to learn something about the pattern of competition between the 
different factions: for example, if Hamas gains public support as a result of a high number of 
Israeli fatalities claimed by it, does this come at the expense of Fatah, its main rival for the 
leadership of the Palestinian Authority, or at the expense of PIJ, a faction that is probably closer 
to Hamas in policy space? 
2)   Lag structure. The vectors Pdt and  contain several lags of Palestinian and Israeli 
fatalities.  Following our previous work (Jaeger et al., 2010), we allow fatalities in each one of 
the  three  four-week  periods  prior  to  the  survey  to  have  a  different  effect  on  the  choice 
probabilities.  The vector Pdt is defined as  , where Pdt-s is the number of 
Palestinian fatalities that occurred in district d in the s
th  four-week period prior to the survey 
date.  Similarly,  , where  is the number of Israeli fatalities claimed by 
faction  k  and  originating  in  district  d  in  the  s
th  four-week  period  prior  to  the  survey  date.  




  Given this definition, the individual elements of αj and βjk represent the effect of a one-
time increase in violence occurring exactly in one of the three four-week periods before the 
survey on the support for faction j.  Since the time pattern of the coefficients may be difficult to 
interpret, we also report results from simulations where we introduce a permanent increase in the   11 
number of fatalities claimed by each one of the factions, and study the effect of this change on 
the different choice probabilities. 
3)  Time and district fixed effects.  The inclusion of time and district fixed effects is key 
for our analysis.  There is substantial variability in the number of Israeli and Palestinian fatalities 
across Palestinian districts.  If the Palestinian population is sorted across districts according to 
their political preferences and violence occurs mainly in radical districts, a simple cross-sectional 
analysis  would  yield  a  spurious  correlation  between  radical  attitudes  and  violence.    The 
availability of longitudinal data allows us to exploit both the time series and the cross-sectional 
variability in our analysis.  The inclusion of district fixed effects allows to hold constant time-
invariant district attributes, and to achieve identification only from the within-district variation in 
political attitudes and in the number of fatalities.  Similarly, the inclusion of time fixed effects 
allows us to control for common factors that affect support for the different factions uniformly 
across all districts at a point in time (e.g., the death of Arafat, and the surge in support for Fatah 
that came with it).  
  Finally, we must recognize that our empirical strategy may yield a biased estimate of the 
causal effect of Palestinian violence on support for the different factions, if the factions respond 
endogenously to swings in public opinion by engaging in attacks against Israeli targets.  If this 
were  the  case,  our  coefficients  would  be  picking  up  the  effect  of  public  opinion  on  Israeli 
fatalities, rather than the effect of fatalities on public opinion.  We are somewhat reassured that 
this is not the case, because we do not find any evidence that Israeli fatalities in the weeks that 
follow  the  survey  are  correlated  with  the  share  of  support  for  the  different  factions  (results 
available upon request).  The reason for this is that probably attacks against Israeli targets require 
a substantial amount of planning, so that it is unlikely that the number of fatalities will respond   12 
very rapidly to changes in public opinion.  While this evidence does not completely rule out the 




We initially examine the effect of overall Israeli and Palestinian violence on support for 
the  different  Palestinian  factions.    As  explained  in  the  previous  section,  we  estimate  a 
multinomial logit model for faction supported.  The results are presented in Table 2.  To facilitate 
comparison across tables, we present the marginal effects of violence on the support for each 
faction, rather than the multinomial logit coefficients.  In addition to the individual marginal 
effects for the number of Palestinian and Israeli fatalities at different lag lengths, we also report 
the sum of the three marginal effects.  This number tells us the effect of a permanent one-unit 
increase in the number of fatalities.  
The results from this analysis show that increases in Palestinian fatalities shift support 
away from all the political factions in the short run.  The size of the decrease in political support 
for Palestinian factions, however, is not statistically or quantitatively significant.  The greatest 
shift is away from Fatah, and it translates into a decrease in support of roughly one percentage 
point in the four weeks prior to a poll for every ten additional Palestinian fatalities.  This shift 
away from political factions in the short run is not only small, but it also dissipates over time.  As 
a consequence, Palestinian fatalities do not cause a permanent shift on the preferences of the 
Palestinian population, as can be seen from the fact that the sum of the marginal effects is always 
small and insignificant.   13 
Contrary to the changes suffered by all the political factions, we observe a significant 
increase  in  the  number  of  disaffected  Palestinians  in  the  short  run.    The  coefficient  on 
“supporting no one” is, by construction, equal to the sum of the coefficients on support for all 
other alternatives but with opposite sign.  This significant shift towards disaffection may also 
reflect  radicalization  as  well  as  disaffection:    Jaeger  et  al.  (2010)  show  that  preferences  of 
disaffected Palestinians are more radical than the preferences of supporters for Fatah, PLFP and 
DFLP but less radical than the preferences of Hamas and PIJ supporters.  It is also possible that 
fatalities induce Palestinians to avoid expressing support for political factions, even if they do 
not really shift their actual political allegiance.  This possibility seems less likely however, since 
the effect of an increase in Palestinian fatalities does not dissipate over time.  Therefore, the 
permanent  effect  of  Palestinian  fatalities  on  disaffection  is  also  positive,  of  an  important 
magnitude, and statistically significant. 
Contrary to the effect of Palestinian fatalities, Israeli fatalities do not seem to have a 
patterned effect on the support for any faction or disaffection, either in the short or long run.  
This  basic  specification  uses  the  number  of  Israeli  fatalities  originating  from  each  specific 
district as the explanatory variable.  Though not reported in the table, the results are essentially 
the same when we use the number of Israeli fatalities aggregated at the national level or at the 
macro-regional level (i.e., West Bank and Gaza) instead of local fatalities as the explanatory 
variable.   
We now turn our attention to the main question of this paper, namely whether there is any 
support  for  the  hypothesis  that  Palestinian  factions  can  gain  public  support  by  engaging  in 
violence against Israel.  In Table 3 we present the marginal effects from the multinomial logit 
model described in equation (2), where we include separately the number of fatalities claimed by   14 
the different factions (Fatah, Hamas, PIJ, and all others) as explanatory variables, at different 
time lags.  Several of the marginal effects are statistically significant, and one can soundly reject 
the null hypothesis that Israeli fatalities have no effect on faction support for three of the four 
factions, while the overall effect of Fatah-claimed fatalities is only marginally insignificant. 
It  is  somewhat  difficult,  however,  to  identify  a  clear  pattern  for  the  individual 
coefficients.  Focusing only on the short run, it appears that Palestinian fatalities lower support 
for Fatah and raise disaffection;  Fatah-claimed fatalities have no effect on any factions;  Hamas-
claimed fatalities lower the number of disaffected;  PIJ-claimed fatalities raise the number of 
disaffected, at the expense of both Hamas and PIJ;  and fatalities claimed by others raise support 
for other factions and PIJ, at the expense of Hamas and the disaffected. 
To get a better sense of the magnitude of the effects, we present in Table 4 the results of 
simulations where we evaluate how support for the different factions changes as a result of a 
permanent two-standard deviation increase in the number of Palestinian fatalities and the number 
of Israeli fatalities claimed by each faction.  Specifically, in evaluating the effect of a permanent 
increase in violence by faction k, we take the following steps: 
a)  Calculate the standard deviation of fatalities claimed by faction k for each of the three 4-
week intervals preceding the poll, separately; 
b)  Take the simple average of these three numbers; 
c)  Add twice the resulting average to the number of fatalities claimed by faction k in each 
one of the three 4-week intervals. 
d)  Re-evaluate the choice probabilities using the estimated model parameters.   15 
Standard  errors  for  the  estimates  are  obtained  by  taking  5,000  draws  from  the  estimated 
parameter  vector,  and  calculating  the  standard  deviation  of  the  predicted  change  in  choice 
probabilities. 
The top row of Table 4 shows the benchmark choice probabilities for each one of the five 
factions.  Then, each row shows the change in support for each faction (in percentage terms) as a 
result of a permanent increase in violence by Israel or by any of the factions.  To highlight the 
own-faction effects (i.e., the change in support for the faction responsible for fatalities) we have 
boxed the numbers on the main diagonal of the matrix.  Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
Our results show that violence by the different factions does not have a large effect on 
Palestinian  support  for  Fatah.    While  an  increase  in  violence  committed  by  Fatah  increases 
Fatah’s support and decreases support for Hamas and disaffection, these effects are negligible 
and not statistically significant.  There is some evidence that Fatah-claimed fatalities lead to a 
small drop in support for other Palestinian factions. 
The table provides, however, some evidence that the outbidding hypothesis applies to 
Hamas.  A higher number of Israeli fatalities claimed by Hamas raises the relative support for 
this faction while lowering the share of disaffected Palestinians.  Also, the second column shows 
that Hamas loses public support when PIJ and other factions claim a high number of Israeli 
fatalities.  
We also observe that the outbidding hypothesis applies to the minor factions, grouped 
into the “others” category, which are able to significantly increase their popularity among the 
Palestinian public through the use of violence against Israelis.  This increase in popularity comes 
at the expense of both Fatah and Hamas, and of the disaffected.   16 
Contrary to the predictions of the outbidding hypothesis, Israeli fatalities claimed by the 
PIJ cause an overall decrease in the support for PIJ, both in the short run and in the long run.  
Interestingly, PIJ violence leads to a large loss in public support for Hamas, the other radical 
faction,  and  leads  to  a  large  increase  in  disaffection  among  the  Palestinian  population.    A 
possible explanation for this finding is that PIJ follows a spoiling strategy rather than a strategy 
of outbidding.  In particular, a spoiling strategy refers to the attempt of extremist factions to 
commit attacks during times of particular cooperation between Israel and the leading Palestinian 
factions, in order to re-start a process of violence and distrust (Kydd and Walter 2002).  While 
this strategy may be successful in derailing cooperation and trust between the Israeli government 
and the leading Palestinian factions, the data show that it may somewhat backfire for the PIJ with 
regards to enjoying the popular support of the Palestinian population.  One possible explanation 
may be that the Palestinian public supports cooperation with Israel while it is occurring, and 
therefore shifts its preferences in favor of disaffection, a more moderate position than support for 
Hamas or PIJ, when PIJ commits attacks. 
 The magnitude of the effect is not very large, but also not negligible.  For example, the 
1.83 percentage point increase in support for Hamas as a result of an increase in Hamas-claimed 
fatalities is more than half as large as the increase in support for Hamas when going from the 
West Bank to the Gaza Strip (3.4 percentage points), about one fourth the size of the effect of 
going from a high school degree to a college degree (7.2 percentage points), and also about one 
fourth of the effect of going from the youngest (15-29 years old) to the oldest (ages 60 and up) 
age group (7.4 percentage points).  Importantly, since fatalities claimed by Hamas also lower the 
share of disaffected Palestinians, this implies that the share of Hamas supporters among potential 
voters may actually increase by as much as 4.3 percentage points,   17 
 
5. Conclusions  
  In this paper we provide an empirical test of the hypothesis that Palestinian factions can 
effectively  use  violence  to  garner  support  from  the  Palestinian  public,  as  measured  through 
opinion polls.  We find mixed support for this hypothesis.  Permanent increases in violence by 
Fatah and Hamas appear to lead to increases in support for these factions, although not through 
reducing support for the other faction.  Rather, violence claimed by Fatah appears to reduce the 
support  of  smaller,  secular  factions  while  violence  claimed  by  Hamas  appears  to  reduce 
disaffection  (i.e.  support  for  no  one).    Violence  by  the  Palestinian  Islamic  Jihad  and  other 
Islamist factions appears to backfire in terms of garnering support for these factions, but also 
reduces support for Hamas and increases disaffection.  Other groups (mostly the PFLP and the 
DFLP) also seem able to increase their support through violence.  In contrast to these results, we 
find little evidence that violence by Israel shifts the balance of support in any particular direction.  
  All of the effects that we estimate are small relative to the average level of support for 
each faction in our data.  This suggests that violence against Israelis plays a relatively minor role 
in determining support for Fatah and Hamas.  Moreover, our results suggest support is not a 
zero-sum game between the two main factions.  To the extent that violence increases support for 
Fatah,  it  comes  at  the  expense  of  other  secular  factions  like  PFLP  and  DFLP.    Similarly, 
increasing support for Hamas through violence comes at the expense of the PIJ and other Islamic 
factions.  Thus, to the extent that violence shifts support, it seems to shift the balance of power 
within the secular factions and within the Islamic factions, but does relatively little to shift the 
balance between the secular (Fatah, PFLP, DFLP) and Islamist (Hamas, PIJ) factions.     18 
  The current paper showed that Palestinian violence affects, to certain extent, the political 
preferences  of  the  Palestinian  population.    Although  effective,  given  the  magnitude  of  the 
coefficients, we believe that a rational faction would not find it efficient to launch a terror attack 
with the exclusive goal of boosting its relative standing among the Palestinian public.  Related 
research showed that terrorism is consistently used to reach other goals, like retaliation against 
Israeli  targeted  killings  (Jaeger  and  Paserman  2009),  creating  political  pressure  in  favor  of 
territorial concessions (Pape 2005 and Gould and Klor 2010) and affecting the preferences of the 
Israeli population (Berrebi and Klor 2008 and 2006).
7  Taking that into account, it seems that a 
strategy of outbidding cannot explain by itself the observed variation in factions’ terror attacks 
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Figure 2:  Palestinian Factions Claiming Responsibilities for Israeli Fatalities,  
2001-2006 (quarterly) 
 Factions 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Entire 
Period
Fatah 22.91 23.22 27.15 32.07 43.36 34.40 29.13
(815) (552) (999) (1,151) (519) (1,034) (5,070)
Hamas 19.79 21.54 16.82 22.79 22.64 35.93 23.00
(704) (512) (619) (818) (271) (1,080) (4,004)
Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other Islamic Factions  9.08  9.09 15.05  7.11  9.44  6.49  9.51
(323) (216) (554) (255) (113) (195) (1,656)
Others 17.29 13.46  6.55  8.64  5.60  5.66  9.90
(615) (320) (241) (310) (67) (170) (1,723)
No One 30.92 32.69 34.43 29.40 18.96 17.53 28.46
(1,100) (777) (1,267) (1,055) (227) (527) (4,953)
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
(3,557) (2,377) (3,680) (3,589) (1,197) (3,006) (17,406)
Year
Table 1
Suport for Different Palestinian Factions Over Time
Notes: Percentage support for each faction by year. Number in parentheses is the total number of observations in each cell. Source:  
Authors' calculations using poll data from DSP.Variable
-1 to 4 weeks -0.109 -0.030 -0.066 -0.051 0.256 **
- 5 to 8 weeks  -0.044 -0.118 0.031 -0.008 0.139
- 9 to 12 weeks 0.065 0.100 ** -0.054 -0.019 -0.091
-0.088 -0.049 -0.089 -0.078 0.304 *
- 1 to 4 weeks -0.123 0.005 -0.064 0.117 0.065
- 5 to 8 weeks  0.231 * -0.082 -0.099 * 0.044 -0.095
- 9 to 12 weeks -0.074 0.180 0.089 -0.007 -0.188
0.034 0.103 -0.073 0.153 -0.218
N
Number of poll × district clusters
Sum of the marginal effects (effect of permanent 
increase in Palestinian fatalities)
Sum of the marginal effects (effect of permanent 



















Source:  Authors' calculations using fatality data from B'Tselem, poll data from DSP, labor market data from the Palestinian Labor Force 
Survey and border closures data from the Palestinian Ministry of Labor.
[0.220] [0.205] [0.167] [0.159]
[0.094]
[0.166]
Note:  Entries in table are marginal effects.  All regressions include controls for residence type, gender, age, marital status, refugee status, 
education dummies, local unemployment rate, the  local wage rate, the average number of closure days in the 30 days preceding the poll, 
and two period dummies. The models include 15 district fixed effects. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the poll-district 
level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level,  ** indicates statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates 









The Effect of Violence on Support for Different Factions
Palestinian fatalities prior to poll (100s): 






-1 to 4 weeks  -0.147 * 0.062 -0.030 -0.063 0.178 **
- 5 to 8 weeks  -0.021 -0.154 0.025 0.035 0.115
- 9 to 12 weeks  0.068 0.100 * -0.048 -0.026 -0.094
Israeli fatalities claimed by Fatah prior to poll, local (100s)
-1 to 4 weeks  0.026 -0.071 0.353 -0.012 -0.296
- 5 to 8 weeks  0.134 0.647 *** -0.107 -0.879 *** 0.205
- 9 to 12 weeks  0.351 -0.471 ** -0.093 -0.056 0.267
-1 to 4 weeks  -0.198 0.204 0.192 0.153 -0.352 **
- 5 to 8 weeks  0.467 ** -0.194 ** -0.147 ** 0.197 ** -0.323
- 9 to 12 weeks  -0.262 0.527 ** 0.035 -0.007 -0.293
-1 to 4 weeks  0.166 -0.319 *** -0.566 *** 0.077 0.642 ***
- 5 to 8 weeks  -0.030 -0.885 -0.518 * 0.095 1.337 ***
- 9 to 12 weeks  -0.293 0.010 0.003 0.104 0.176
-1 to 4 weeks  -2.154 -9.680 *** 2.468 * 13.012 *** -3.646 **
- 5 to 8 weeks  -1.534 ** 1.650 *** 1.007 *** -1.285 *** 0.162
- 9 to 12 weeks  1.257 1.685 -0.196 3.973 *** -6.719 ***
N
Number of poll × district clusters
χ
2 test that Palestinian fatalities have no effect on faction 
support  (p-value) (0.038)
χ
2 test that Israeli fatalities claimed by Fatah have no effect on 




2 test that Israeli fatalities claimed by Hamas have no effect 


































2 test that Israeli fatalities claimed by PIJ have no effect on 














Palestinian fatalities prior to poll (100s): 
Israeli fatalities claimed by Hamas prior to poll (100s)




2 test that Israeli fatalities claimed by Others have no effect 




The Effect of Israeli Fatalities Claimed by Different Factions on Support for Different Factions
[0.207] [0.170] [0.160]
[0.235]
Source:  Authors' calculations using fatality data from B'Tselem, poll data from DSP, labor market data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey and border 





Note:  Entries in the table represent marginal effects. All regressions include controls for area, residence type, gender, age, marital status, refugee status, 
religion, education dummies, local unemployment rate, the  local wage rate, the average number of closure days in the 30 days preceding the poll, and period 
controls. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering at the poll-district level, in brackets; * indicates statistically significant at 10% level,  ** indicates 
statistically significant at 5% level; *** indicates statistically significant at 1% level.
Multinomial Logit:  Marginal Effects for




[0.727]Fatah Hamas PIJ Others No One
Benchmark 29.13 23.00 9.51 9.90 28.46
Israel - 0.96  0.09 - 0.59 - 0.61  2.07
(1.29) (1.25) (1.02) (1.08) (1.65)
Fatah  1.13  0.18  0.37 - 2.09 *  0.41
(1.43) (1.37) (1.19) (1.15) (1.35)
Hamas - 0.20  1.83 *  0.28  1.42 - 3.33 **
(1.29) (1.10) (1.09) (1.08) (1.37)
PIJ - 0.55 - 2.87 * - 2.57 ***  0.64  5.35 ***
(1.64) (1.57) (0.81) (0.79) (1.59)
Others - 1.67 - 2.52 **  0.94  7.27 *** - 4.02 ***
(1.36) (1.20) (0.97) (2.57) (1.17)
Support for:
Percentage change in supports as a result of a permanent increase in violence by:
Table 4
Permanent Effect of Factions' Increase on Violence on their Support
Notes: Entries in the table show the percentage change in choice probabilities as a result of a permanent, two-standard deviation
increase in the number of fatalities claimed by each faction. The choice probabilities are calculated based on the parameter
estimates from the model in Table 3. See text for a full description of the procedure for calculating choice probabilities and standard
errors.